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Abstract
Italy was the first European country to experience the impact of COVID-19. In order to deal with the health emergency, in
early March 2020, the Italian government enforced strict lockdown measures. The different Italian police forces, the
Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri and city police forces (Polizia Municipale), patrolled the streets, ensuring that people stayed at
home and non-essential shops remained closed. These police forces received unprecedented support from the public in
enforcing lockdown. People were active in their neighbourhoods, taking pictures of alleged violators and reporting them
to the police, as well as posting pictures of those violating the rules on social networks. Local administrators encouraged
citizens to report lockdown violations and in the case of Rome, introduced an online reporting system. This article focuses
on the policing of lockdown in Italy. The article develops the argument that public attitudes, defined as policing from
below, combined with policing from above by local administrators, produced a populist policing of the lockdown.
Qualitative methodology is used to discuss interviews with police officers and analyse newspaper articles. Populist
political forces are hegemonising in Italy, relying on the feelings of insecurity that the virus has embittered. Populist
hegemony strongly influenced the policing of problems related to COVID. The lack of community policing or plural
policing models within the organisation of Italian police forces, which remain a combination of continental and colonial
models, has been decisive in the development of populist policing. The consequence of this is a type of ‘policing on
demand’, with the public providing the police with intelligence and demanding enforcement.
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Introduction: policing and populism
Italy was the first European country to be seriously
impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. From 7 February
2020, when the first cases were identified in Codogno, near
Milan, the pandemic escalated to the point at which,
throughout March 2020, Italy ranked second after China
in terms of contagion and death toll. Such dramatic and
abrupt spread of the disease caused the Italian government
to hastily approve a decree limiting the movement of citi-
zens (Istituto Cattaneo, 2020).
This article discusses policing of the COVID-19 lock-
down from 8 March to 4 May 2020. First, the public helped
the police forces. Reports of lockdown violations were con-
veyed in a plurality of ways. Alerts sent to the police by
phone were combined with mobile phone pictures or by the
creation of social network pages showing lockdown viola-
tors. Here, we saw direct, mass public participation in poli-
cing activities, based on models combining different
approaches such as policing on demand (Conover and
Liederbach, 2015) and community-oriented policing
(Makin and Marenin, 2017). Mobilisation of the public
spurred on by the moral panic caused by the coronavirus
pandemic helped the process of enforcement by Italian
police forces. Thanks to community intelligence provided
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by the public via a wide range of tools (Bullock, 2010;
Innes and Roberts, 2008; Sheptycki, 2003), it was possible
for police forces to monitor accurately the public and
firmly enforce lockdown measures. The legitimacy of poli-
cing (Tankebe, 2009) depended more on adherence to
social mores by police forces (Clark, 2008), in this case
moral panic about coronavirus, than on procedural fairness
(Gilmour, 2008). The Italian coronavirus pandemic poli-
cing model is hereby defined as populist policing. This is
because it draws on the current populist context dominated
by the Five Star Movement (Laclau, 2005; Mudde and
Kaltwasser, 2017) founded by the comic actor Beppe Grillo
in 2007. Its standpoints consist of a law-and-order
approach, conveyed through widespread use of the media
(Stockman and Scalia, 2020).
Some authors (Mény and Surel, 2001) have outlined a
taxonomy of populism, defined as three main political atti-
tudes: (a) opposition to ruling elites; (b) the people as a
nation with a homogeneous identity; and (c) the people as
sovereign taking a stance against the corrupt elite. Since the
early 1990s, when the ‘Tangentopoli’ corruption scandal
brought about the collapse of the post-war political parties,
populism has been on the rise in Italy (Ginsborg, 1992;
McDonnell, 2006). First, the Lega Nord and eventually the
Five Star Movement became governmental partners in
2018. Their anti-corruption stance is based on a law-and-
order approach that consists of strengthening police powers
and the enforcement of more punishment-oriented laws.
Populist policing comprises two parts. The first is poli-
cing from below, that is, those practises enacted by the
public as a reaction to lockdown violations. Reporting
police intervention coincided with the stigmatisation of
violators by the media and with direct action by citizens,
such as verbal and physical abuse. The second, populist
policing from above, refers to practixes enacted by local
administrators such as mayors and regional presidents to
encourage the public to invigilate lockdown enforcement.
The mayor of Rome, for example, promoted an online
reporting system. Others, like the mayor of Messina, used
drones to insult alleged violators. This is discussed in depth
below. Some authors (Loader, 2000) have proposed a
descriptive taxonomy of the policing field, defining as
‘policing below government’ a model based on vigilantism,
neighbourhood watch and citizen patrols. Populist policing
differs from Loader’s taxonomy insofar as it does not
involve a neighbourhood watch and the role of public
police forces remains central.
Therefore, contextualisation of Italian policing within
politics is necessary, in addition to an illustration of the
anti-COVID-19 measures issued by the Italian government.
A description of the public health model adopted by the
Italian government is related to the epidemic psychology
model (Strong, 1990) to explain how the pandemic trig-
gered the rise of moral panic and boosted populist policing.
The analytical path used winds through a qualitative
approach. In-depth interviews with lawyers and police offi-
cers across Italy are integrated with newspaper articles to
provide a plurality of sources, enabling the development of
a wide-ranging perspectives.
Anti-COVID policing measures in Italy:
populism and epidemic psychology
In his model of epidemic psychology, Strong (1990) argues
that when medical emergencies occur, emotions play a
crucial role in shaping the strategies a society uses to deal
with them. This was the case in Italy. The government
chose to enact an immediate lockdown because of the
abrupt escalation of the pandemic. Although dictated by
the emergency, this choice neglected to develop and pro-
mote a public health model in which local communities
could be involved in better management of the pandemic
(Torri and Sbrogiò, 2020). Local governments were given
powers to cope with the emergency, while police forces and
the army were in charge of ensuring lockdown measures
were enforced.
Decree No. 11/20201, issued on 8 March 2020, limited
the movement of Italians. It was only possible to travel
within one’s city of residence, making necessary the pos-
session of a self-written certificate (autocertificazione) stat-
ing the reason for being outside the home. Movement was
possible only for work, health and family reasons, as well
as for shopping. Exercise was allowed only within the
immediate area around the home. Journeys within Italy
were restricted and were limited to either workers moving
across the country or those who had serious family-related
issues. Only food, medicine, newspaper and tobacco shops
were allowed to remain open, as were the offices of pro-
fessionals such as solicitors, engineers, architects, dentists
and doctors. Io resto a casa (‘I am staying home’) was the
slogan the government chose to make sure the public
reacted positively to the biggest restriction of civil liberties
Italy has faced since the collapse of the Fascist regime.
Police forces patrolled the country to ensure enforce-
ment of the decree. Police patrols consisted of three differ-
ent types of activities. First, stop and search of people
moving around, to make sure that they both had the neces-
sary certificate and that their reason for being outside was
compliant with the decree. Second, territorial control by the
mobile division of the Polizia di Stato (volanti) who made
sure that no-one congregated in public areas such as parks,
which had been closed to the public, and checked that
people who were gathering were doing so for justifiable
reasons, such as queueing outside supermarkets or health-
care providers. Third, police forces ensured that all non-
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essential shops were closed. Violation of the decree was
sanctioned by fines of 400 to 4,000 euros2, with imprison-
ment for violators who had COVID-19. Patrols were con-
cerned with compliance by those shopkeepers who
remained open despite the prohibitions issued by the
decree, which allowed only supermarkets, pharmacies and
newsagents to remain open. Italian citizens returning from
abroad had to undergo a two-week period of quarantine.
Decree No.11/2000 did not just entail a strict limitation
of personal liberties; its constitutional legitimacy was ques-
tioned because it limited the liberty of movement granted
by Article 16 of the Italian Charter. In fact, the COVID-19
emergency was dealt with through the use of government
decrees, use of which should be limited, and without wide-
ranging discussion in the Italian Parliament. Nonetheless,
Italian citizens gave these limitations their widespread con-
sent, actively cooperating with police forces to ensure that
the lockdown measures were enforced. The enforcers, that
is the Italian police forces, did not try to develop collabora-
tion with the public. The Italian government did not imple-
ment any public health model by which collaboration
between the police and the public could have developed
(Murphy et al., 2008), following the same pattern as its
predecessors. As a consequence of this, the continental
approach of the Italian police forces continued, paving the
way for populist policing.
From continental to populist policing:
the unimplemented community policing/
plural policing model
The Italian police consists of a plurality of forces: the Poli-
zia di Stato, who patrol big cities; the Carabinieri, a mili-
tary force who patrol the whole country; and the Polizia
Municipale (city police), who work on local duties such as
evictions, traffic, parking and shop licences. Police forces
are centralised, following the continental model (Mawby,
1999), with strict government control coupled with an ele-
ment of militarisation, like the French Gendarmerie.
Moreover, Italy’s relatively recent independence (1860)
resulted in a colonial policing model (Brogden, 1987).
Northern Italian police officers dealt with the demands of
southern populations through the use of special laws, such
as the Pica Act against Brigands (1863). Frequent mass
brutality, abuse and prejudice (Benigno, 2015; Mack
Smith, 2000; Teti, 2000) soon alienated the southerners
from police forces.
Centralisation and militarisation were emphasised by
the Fascist regime (Canosa, 1976), as public order increas-
ingly overlapped with political subversion. The post-War
democratic state retained middle and high-ranking officers
appointed by the previous regime and the authoritarian
laws that had been passed. The international political con-
text of the Cold War and a culture of isolation within the
Italian police (Della Porta and Reiter, 2003; Palidda, 2000;
Reiner, 1997) increased the gulf between the public and
police forces until late 1981. Under mass demands for
wide-ranging political and social reforms (Ginsborg,
1992), demilitarisation of the Polizia di Stato was enforced.
Police trade unions were legalised and their members advo-
cated for dialogue with communities, although a ‘critical
threshold’ (Della Porta and Reiter, 2003) continued to mar
relations between police forces and some specific groups,
such as militants on the political extreme-left and football
supporters. Social, local and political differences, com-
bined with a centralised organisation working within an
authoritarian framework and through a staff appointed
under an authoritarian regime, historically gave low levels
of legitimacy to the Italian police forces until the 1990s.
The end of the 20th century marked a watershed in this
respect. The end of the Cold War brought about the col-
lapse of the Italian political system together with a serious
economic crisis. A demand for security spread in metropol-
itan areas of the former ‘industrial triangle’, namely Milan,
Turin and Genoa. Residents of working class districts
formed spontaneous civic committees (Dal Lago, 1998;
Nelken, 2001; Selmini, 1999). Protests against the presence
of the homeless, Roma, illegal migrants and drug dealers in
their areas soon evolved into the creation of spontaneous
protection squads using violence against these new and
supposedly dangerous classes (Bauman, 1999; Chevallier,
1977). Reports to the police soared dramatically as the
press fuelled moral panic among the public (Cohen,
1971; Maneri, 2001); new political right-wing forces, such
as the Northern League, the ex-neofascists of Alleanza
Nazionale (AN) and Berlusconi’s Forza Italia enhanced
their status through a campaign of law and order. The
right-wing coalition gained legitimacy across the north.
The Ministry of the Interior, which controls police forces,
was assigned to either AN or Northern League party mem-
bers by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who ruled Italy
from 1996 to 2001 and again from 2008 to 2011. Police
raids against drug dealers, the homeless and illegal
migrants spread across the country (Barbagli, 2001) as the
Northern League founded its own ronde padane (Padan, i.e.
Northern Italian protection squads) to force Roma out of
the camps and chase prostitutes from the streets. Right-
wing mayors took advantage of new electoral reforms that
allowed people to elect them to order City Police forces to
evict illegal residents and fine abusive market vendors, who
were mostly migrants (Pavarini, 2005; Vianello, 2007).
However, the populist policing model of the right wing
was counterbalanced by an attempt by some left-wing
administered regions to introduce community policing
(Skogan, 1989, 2004). Under the supervision of such
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outstanding criminologists as Dario Melossi and Massimo
Pavarini, the local government of Emilia-Romagna pro-
moted the idea of Città Sicure (Secure Cities) that aimed
for democratic management of policing and security. Joint
committees, including police forces, academics and local
administrators were set up. Facilitators were sent around
the region to create local security committees and promote
citizen participation in the management of public order
(Selmini, 1999). Public meetings between residents, local
administrators and police forces were organised to meet
growing demands for a model that was more compliant
with democratic laws (Shilston, 2015) and more respectful
of minorities and marginal groups (Skogan, 2004).
This attempt to introduce changes in Italian policing was
short-lived because it never gained the support of the
national government. There were internal divisions over
police reforms in both the centre-right and centre-left coa-
litions who ruled the country, and the growing securitarian
attitude of Italian public opinion (Barbagli, 1999) discour-
aged governments from undertaking any changes in the
structure of policing. Even the constitutional reform of
2001, giving regions increased powers, left both the orga-
nisation and the tasks of the different police forces
unchanged. The recession of 2008 provoked a new crisis
of legitimacy in the Italian political system, bringing about
the rise of the populist Five Star Movement and growth of
the Northern League, which has given up its own secessio-
nist ideals (Baldini and Cento Bull, 2009). Both parties,
drawing on public resentment of politicians, were satisfied
with the continental/colonial police model that prevailed in
Italy, rejecting any proposals for reform. The idea of police
forces as organisations vested with special powers to clamp
down on designated outsiders (Becker, 1963), that is, ref-
ugees, migrants, political activists, etc., on behalf of the
people, became increasingly popular in Italy. The
COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated how the Italian public
has been urging (Conover and Liederbach, 2015) police
forces to comply with the demand for security.
Methodology
This article is the first stage of a wide-ranging research
project on COVID-19 policing in Italy. A qualitative meth-
odology was used (Altheide and Schneider, 2013; Schwartz
and Jakobs, 1988), which from the outset was deemed the
best way to develop the subject of this work.
In-depth interviews with lawyers and police officers
across Italy form the primary data used in this study. The
advantages of this method are manifold (Marvasti, 2004).
First, interviews allowed the researcher to understand
respondents’ points of view, and how they make sense of
the world. It thus became possible to delve into the routine
practices and values of the participant. Second, because
there were no fixed questions to answer, respondents felt
free to develop their views and provide the researcher with
their feelings about the interview topic. Third, in-depth
interviews disclosed the complexity of reality because par-
ticipants reflected at length and expressed themselves
freely, bringing to the fore the contradictory aspects within
a specific issue. The choice of in-depth interviews for this
work is related to the purpose of shedding light on the
perceptions, feelings and opinions of the privileged
witnesses.
Newspaper articles compliment the interview findings
and provide the reader with a background to the context
under discussion (Marvasti, 2004). The interviews were
with nine police officers from Northern, Central and South-
ern Italy. All had long-term police experience and occupied
middle ranks within the police hierarchy. The same criteria
of geography and number were applied to lawyers. All the
privileged witnesses were granted anonymity, following
the informed consent model: participants were given a writ-
ten form specifying that they had the right to choose
whether or not to participate, that they were entitled to
withdraw anytime and that their privacy would be pro-
tected. Moreover, lawyers were guaranteed that cases con-
cerning their clients would be anonymised. Because of the
pandemic, it was necessary to conduct the interviews online
and so the locations of the cases discussed are not specified.
The interviewed police officers are designated as follows:
P1–P3 refer to Northern Italy, P4–P6 to Central Italy and
P7–P9 to Southern Italy. The same designations are used
for the lawyers: L1–L3 refer to Northern Italy, L4–L6 to
Central Italy and L7–L9 to Southern Italy. Because the first
six interviews were collected during lockdown, they were
conducted using an electronic platform. After lockdown
was released on 4 June 2020 it was possible to move across
Italy to carry out interviews in person. Following requests
from participants, particularly police officers, interviews
were not recorded. This made it possible to avoid any issue
of ethics.
Populist policing from below: reports
to police
Although some authors, such as Giorgio Agamben (2020),
challenged the Italian public to adopt a critical attitude
towards the risks of a state of exception (Agamben,
1995), the majority of Italian public opinion sided with the
government. A poll by the Demos Institute from June 2020
shows that 56% of Italians agreed with a limitation of lib-
erties under exceptional circumstances. In another poll,
commissioned by the Catholic trade union CISL a few
months earlier and prior to the peak of the pandemic, the
figure was 72%. This outcome contrasts with the view of
the Italian Catholic Church which constantly expressed,
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through its newspaper Avvenire3, its objections to the gov-
ernmental limitations. Public approval for the anti-COVID
limitations also resulted in widespread support for police
action.
Because the media supported the government decree,
police forces were deployed on patrols to ensure effective
enforcement. Both the Polizia di Stato and Carabinieri made
more than nine million stops between 8 March and 4 May,
when the so-called Fase 2 (Stage 2) marked the gradual
easing of lockdown. City Police forces (Polizia Municipale)
were also active in patrolling the country, ensuring enforce-
ment of mayors’ ordinanze (ordnances), which matched the
restrictions ordered by the government. A total of 449,628
fines were issued for violation of the lockdown4.
In addition to patrols, intense reporting by the public
took place across Italy. As two northern Italian police offi-
cers reported:
People have always been reporting here. We used to receive
reports about attempted burglaries by Roma, migrants selling
drugs . . . these weeks we have been coping with reports about
the violation of lockdown. [P1]
It was not a novelty for us. This time, though, we had been
dealing with a much greater flurry of reports than in the past,
and this made us feel stressed, also because it added to our fear
of being infected ourselves. [P3]
A similar attitude, although different from the usual
trend, seemed to characterise the Southern Italian public
according to officers in that region:
We were used to old widowers reporting about overnight par-
ties (Italian law states that parties in private houses cannot last
after midnight); these days have been a mess. Looks like
everybody was eager to report about who was doing what.
Maybe it is because of fear, but it is something unprecedented
and unexpected. People used to mind their [own] business
here. [P7]
Women had always been insulting us. They knew us for
arresting their children or searching their flats. Now you see a
group of them coming to the office and screaming. ‘Hey’, I
said, ‘it is not time to protest, there’s something else going
on . . . ’. ‘No, no’ they replied, ‘no protest. We just want you to
help us. Someone regularly has barbecues in the building
opposite ours . . . Please, do something! Do you want us to
die?’[P9]
Officers in Central Italy also refer to the unusual number
of phone calls and reports:
During the first days of the lockdown, we received something
like 2,000 reports per day. It was too much to cope with. Our
superior had to do an appeal on local media about reducing the
number of calls because we were unable to deal with all of
them. After that, the number of calls slowly decreased to 300
in the last week of the lockdown. [P4]
You know, we have what we call our ‘usual guests’: old
women complaining about their neighbours playing the
music too loud. Residents reporting screaming from the door
opposite theirs, hoping we will discover some violent crime
thanks to their report. They are our regular guests. This time
we had more ‘guests’ than ever, and, in a way, you feel
responsible, because you could see people were just scared
and worried. [P5]
We couldn’t believe . . . there were people bringing pic-
tures, videos, eager to show the evidence they had collected.
A neighbour jogging. Someone ringing the bell late at night.
Someone else going out. Very accurate investigations
(laughs . . . ). [P6]
All nine police officers shared the view of a widespread,
unusual demand for policing during lockdown. In the case
of Southern Italy, police officers faced an apparent, abrupt
growth in their legitimacy among the local population.
Local differences were overcome by a fear of the spread
of coronavirus, triggering increasing demands for policing
(Conover and Liederbach, 2015) that police forces were
unprepared for, in relation to both their usual workload and
their routine occupations.
Traditional policing matters – such as thefts, burglaries
and robberies – were overshadowed by the demand to
enforce lockdown. Not only did police forces face unpre-
cedented demands, but they were also forced to change the
focus of their ordinary practises, adapting their work to
the rapid change in social mores (Clark, 2008). This is
an important aspect of the demand for policing during
lockdown as it appears that fear brought about a radical
change of perception in the Italian population vis-à-vis the
police:
Let me quote you some excerpt[s] from a report. There is a
left-wing activist I have known for ages, as I met him when
patrolling political demonstrations. The same person
reported his neighbours partying during the lockdown, and
this is what is stated in the report: ‘you’ve got to help us. We
are facing a human inhumanity (sic!), that does not care about
sacrifices and renunciations, who does not care about the
need of sacrifice to pursue a superior need . . . we must be
on the same side against them.’ I could hardly believe it was
the same person who used to call me ‘murderer’ when he
came across me after the violence occurring in Genoa in
2001. [P1]
Yes, one might not believe it. To meet political activists,
who have a negative bias against you, here in the police office.
And them telling you: ‘this time we are on the same side. We
must cooperate’. What?! I am curious to see how these people
behave after all this is over. [P3]
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Fear of coronavirus overcame the ideological divide
across Italy as some left-wing militants regarded enforce-
ment of the lockdown as a battle to defend public health:
A trade union member, reporting youths hanging out in the
park outside his building, stated: ‘this is the new frontier of
militant anti-fascism. Citizens and police must work together
in the defence of public health’. [P4]
The justification that the current majority government has
a centre-left component in the Democratic Party and the Free
and Equals party (LEU) can only partly explain such a
remarkable shift in public mood and perception. These
reports show how police forces were being vindicated even
by traditionally hostile sectors of Italian society. Demands to
enforce the emergency measures ordered by the government
became a priority, also reducing reports of other crimes:
The figures for reports about property crime and personal
offences have never been so low for ages . . . who knows what
is going to happen when all this is over. [P4].
We don’t know what’s going on here in the south. They say
the mafia controlled lootings and property crimes. There were
even less property crime reports than ever, anyway. But there
also were unusual crowds of people ready to report alleged
violators. From different social backgrounds. [P9]
Despite the abrupt rise in the numbers of reports, police
officers assessed citizen collaboration positively:
You know, we are supposed to patrol the territory, so we
mainly focused our work on the section of the government
decree regulating the limitation of movements. We did not
have a good grasp of what was happening inside: parties,
barbeques. So, the reports of people proved a great help to
us. [P1]
We mainly made sure that people did not come to the city
centre and that they had the self-certification form . . . Reports
were essential for us to have a broad perspective on how the
decree was enforced in neighbourhoods. [P7]
The positive public reception relates to the need to
gather information as a complimentary activity to patrol-
ling of the region by police forces, which in this case was
even more necessary to ensure that people both stayed
home and did not gather to prevent the spread of the cor-
onavirus. There is something of a division of labour, with
patrolling of public spaces carried out by the police and
controlling private places and behaviours enforced by the
public. We are looking at a multilevel manifestation of
policing, with the co-production of police practises (Makin
and Marenin, 2017) entailing constant, active collaboration
with the public, which strongly legitimises police work and
actively provides public assistance.
I define this model as populist policing from below
because it relies on a widespread demand for security by
the public triggered by the COVID-19 emergency. The
public is active in policing, such as spotting violations,
trying to repress them and reporting to the police. This
public cooperation is not the outcome of a planned and
structured approach to policing involving citizens in the
management of crime, as in the case of community poli-
cing. Individuals spontaneously reported to the police any
alleged violations of lockdown, driven by fear of the virus
spreading. As Tankebe (2009) points out, concern about the
seriousness of a crime influences the public’s attitude more
than their interest in the fairness of procedures. Insofar as
the public demands enforcement by the police, demands for
the outcome will be more important the respect for proce-
dures. Different authors (Bauman, 2006; Durkheim, 2000;
Garland, 2003; Simon, 2007) note that demands for more
social control and punishment are crucial resources regu-
lating social relations during periods of deep crisis. The
current demand for security has been fuelled by deep
changes contemporary society over the past 30 years. Frag-
mentation, individualisation and more fragile social bonds
have weakened public trust (Putnam, 2004), encouraging
the emergence of a more punitive society. The coronavirus
crisis, a health emergency risking the public’s survival, has
led to an increase in demands for security. The Italian
context is unique in this respect. First, throughout March
2020, Italy had the highest rate of COVID-19 cases in the
world after China. In addition, policing in Italy has not
developed community-based models, making direct, mass
reporting the only way the public had to cooperate with
police forces. Finally, the populist government and local
administrations, as detailed below, encouraged the report-
ing activities of the public.
A combination of ‘ethical’ aspects, that is, respecting
lockdown to prevent spread of the virus and the more func-
tional demand to suppress violators, eliminated respect for
procedures by the public, resulting in the public stigmatisa-
tion (Goffman, 1963; Foucault, 1976) of alleged violators
without consideration for the presumption of innocence or
respect for privacy. A lawyer in Northern Italy recounted
his client’s experience in a middle-class district:
He is separated, but he has a son living in the other part
of town. My client went there regularly to pick up his son
from his ex-wife’s flat and spent a couple of hours with him.
One day, he was surrounded by a crowd of people who
obliged him to wait for the police. ‘Stay home, you mur-
derer!’, they started shouting. Then, the police came over,
and they were given pictures of him parking the car, ringing
the buzzer. Pictures they had taken days before! They thought
he had a mistress there. My client showed the police his
self-certification form, but he did not have a pleasant
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afternoon . . . Now we want money for defamation, aggres-
sion, and violation of privacy. [L1]
I think there is no sufficient knowledge of the laws. People
are almost enthusiastic; they feel powerful with their elec-
tronic devices. Someone should explain them that such crimes
as defamation and assault are prosecuted by the law. [L2]
Things were not very different at the opposite end of the
country. Runners were targeted for violating lockdown
because exercise was allowed only around one’s own resi-
dential block. A young man spotted jogging on the beach of
a Southern Italian city was forcefully stopped by a group of
neighbours from the area who insulted him and forced him
to wait for the Carabinieri, who were shown footage pro-
duced by the accusers:
He lived a couple of blocks away. I agree that he violated the
lockdown as he was running half a kilometre longer than
allowed, but this recalls lynching. Someone patrolling the street,
others taking pictures, others blocking him, and then calling the
police. Everything organized! Do they have a licence to do it?
Ok, they do not have weapons; they called the police, but it is an
outright aggression and violation of privacy! [L7]
Another case probably has more to do with voyeurism
than with public safety:
My client works outside the city. His wife had moved to the
new flat just before the lockdown. Neighbours did not know
him. He came home when the lockdown was enforced. He
found the entrance cordoned off, and an aggressive crowd
ready to beat him: who are you? Why are you disturbing the
lady here? . . . it’s exaggerated, really. [L4]
All these cases make a crucial point, the reports were not
accidental: pictures and videos of alleged violators were
taken regularly, someone spotted ‘violators’ through a win-
dow, and others intervened to block the violator and call the
police. None of the reporters belonged to either a political
group or a protection squad. This was a spontaneous, self-
organised practise. Moreover, in both cases, there was ver-
bal aggression and physical restraint, but there was no
violence towards violators. The public contacted the police,
who were recognised as the legitimate authority to deal
with the violation. This is similar to another case, in Central
Italy, which is different from the other two:
My client accidentally found pictures of himself going to the
supermarket and walking down the street. Locals had given
him a nickname and slandered him because he went out every
day for shopping. Other pictures, concerning other people,
were on the same Facebook page. They [locals] had nothing
[else] to do, so they had time to take pictures, but now we are
promoting a collective judicial action. It is a crime, and you
must face the consequences of it. [L4]
The point raised by the lawyer is relevant to our discus-
sion: why did the public feel the duty to cooperate with the
police? Banfield (1982) and Putnam (1985) exposed differ-
ent degrees of civic duty in different Italian regions. In the
age of lockdown, civic duty-related differences have appar-
ently been overcome, and the public has even self-
organised to cooperate with the police. It is unlikely that
a sudden rise in civic duty could have occurred in such a
short time, especially after the changes in Italian society
discussed previously. One reason for populist policing
might be lockdown itself. People observed and reported
others to compensate for their own passive state. This
leisure-oriented explanation is not sufficient, however, as
it needs to be situated within the social and political con-
text. Participation by the Italian public in the policing of
coronavirus might appear to be an original form of policing
on demand (Conover and Liederbach, 2015). It follows the
pattern of evolving social mores (Makin and Marenin,
2017), because the dominant mood in March and April
2020 was one of fear. It does not follow, however, a struc-
tured pattern of a public, negotiated and agreed-upon pol-
icy. Fear was manipulated by political exponents,
particularly at the local level, who played a central role
in encouraging the public to report violators. In other
words, this was not a negotiated participation, but rather
a request for information that was answered positively by
the citizens, who provided the information necessary for
the police forces to suppress lockdown violations. Thus,
Italian policing of the coronavirus pandemic might be
defined as community intelligence (Bullock, 2010),
encouraged from above. The cooperation of the public goes
in the direction of providing police forces with information,
and there is no quest for cooperation in the management of
the emergency. Below, I describe and discuss this aspect in
depth, focusing on its peculiarities.
Populist policing from above: political
support
Since the late 1990s, claims about decentralisation have
brought about meaningful political reforms. Act n.81 of
1993 introduced the direct election of mayors, while the
2001 constitutional reform increased the powers held by
regions. City mayors and regional presidents became the
focus of increased demand for security by citizens5.
Despite this, police powers held by local authorities did not
increase, as Act n.121 of 1981 introduced a Provincial
Committee for Order and Public Security (CPOSP) whose
head is the prefetto, that is, the officer the Ministry of
Interior appoints in every province (an intermediate local
authority between cities and regions) to coordinate police
forces. The law states that this committee comprising
mayors, police commanders and the questore (the chief
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of State Police) has only a consulting role, with the prefetto
making the final decisions.
This imbalance in accountability (local administrators
are accountable to their voters and the prefetti are accoun-
table to the government) has provoked conflict. For exam-
ple, during the coronavirus pandemic, the president of
Calabria decided to reopen bars and restaurants on 4 May
2020, thus violating the governmental decree. A similar
situation arose with the president of Sardinia, who wanted
to introduce a COVID-19 test for Lombardy residents land-
ing on the island. Local administrators tried be in tune with
the public mood, that is, fear of the virus spreading during
lockdown. Reports and denunciations were actively
encouraged so that mayors and regional presidents could
both make up for their lack of effective power and increase
public consent.
A ‘government of fear’ (Simon, 2007) became the main
pattern of authority during lockdown. Government decrees
were enhanced by issuing rigid ordnances as well as by
mobilising local police forces. Moral panic about corona-
virus matched the populist turn in Italian politics in the
previous five years. The most notable case concerns Rome,
whose mayor, FSM populist Virginia Raggi, introduced an
online reporting system, the so-called Sistema Unico di
Segnalazione (Single Reporting System)6. Citizens were
encouraged to fill out form and upload material, such as
reports and pictures concerning any violations of lock-
down, to the city police. Local officers then assessed the
content of the reports and decided whether to fine the
alleged violators or report them to the police. Raggi’s ini-
tiative generated a bitter discussion about the ‘mayor-sher-
iffs’ but remained an isolated case. Other mayors followed
different pathways to encourage reports of lockdown viola-
tions. The mayor of Palermo, Leoluca Orlando, encouraged
the public to report violations, publicly praising some cit-
izens who had reported a group of people organising a
barbeque on the roof of a high-rise building, and calling
the violators ‘uncivilized criminals’7. The mayor of Mes-
sina, Cateno De Luca, chose a more dramatic method. He
hired drones to fly over the city and spot violators. When
alleged violators were spotted, the recorded voice of the
mayor insulted them (‘Where the f*** are you
going . . . ?’)8. The drones took pictures that were eventu-
ally used to compile a report to the police.
These cases, despite being different, are all in the direc-
tion of populist policing from above (Laclau, 2005; Loader,
2000). This is because there is no structured, negotiated
policing strategy that involves active public collaboration.
Rather, there is an instrumental use of public fear to
encourage reports and trigger intervention by police forces,
and a consequent neglect of civil liberties as privacy and
the presumption of innocence. The actions of mayors legit-
imised the public to undertake acts of mass denunciation,
which might not always be efficient as it does not distin-
guish between real and alleged violators. Coordinated
action through a community-oriented policing scheme
would have been more efficient and more respectful of
individual liberties.
Italian mayors have limited policing power because the
government and its appointed officers are vested with the
main responsibilities of public order (Pavarini, 2007; Via-
nello, 2007). This lack of a plural, decentralised policing
structure contrasts sharply with citizens’ expectations of
local administrations since the reforms of 1993. This con-
tradiction is resolved by populism. There are no intermedi-
ate contexts, such as local committees, wherein local
administrators can meet public demands for policing. Also,
mayors have a limited range of power. Consequently, all
they can do is encourage the public to report violations of
the law, thus giving up the possibility of calibrating the
response to a widespread concern such as the pandemic.
The participation of citizens as well as mayors is secondary
in this process. On the one hand, policing is carried out
based on the social mores of the moment, that is the fear
of contagion (Clark, 2008). On the other hand, populist
policing does not consist of real participation in preventive
and enforcement-oriented actions. Both the Rome and
Sicily cases, which were the most publicised, show how
populist policing consists mainly of wide-ranging com-
munity intelligence activities (Bullock, 2010) by which
police forces are provided with information, but does not
produce real public participation in policing. Moreover,
mass stigmatisation and criminalisation can result in
increasingly bitter relations within a community, as well
as ultimately worsening the relationship between the police
and the public.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to define as populist policing all
those policing practices, in a broader sense, that were
enacted in Italy from March to May 2020 to enforce lock-
down. I consider it the first step in a more wide-ranging
study as more in-depth interviews and more specific data
are necessary. This initial stage of research enables us to
define populist policing as a combination of three elements.
The first concerns the centralised and colonial model of the
Italian police. The second relates to public fear about the
spread of COVID-19, which has catalysed securitarian atti-
tudes in Italian society that have developed over the past 30
years. The third element of populist policing relates to the
hegemony of populism within Italian politics.
The Italian police have never undergone a process of full
demilitarisation and decentralisation. No structured project
aimed at involving the public in policing activities has been
carried out. Consequently, police forces have retained a
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traditional attitude based on the suppression of crime and
the mere obedience by the public. The anti-COVID-19
measures enforced by the government were within this
structure. People were asked to stay at home, to self-
certify their movements and to comply with the controls
enacted by police forces patrolling their region. No discus-
sions with local committees, such as district councils (even
through the use of IT tools) took place, and no attempt was
made to involve the local population as an auxiliary force.
Although one can appreciate this was not customary gov-
ernment practices either, such an emergency could have
paved the way for a reform of policing involving citizens
in the management of public order.
The lack of a negotiated, participatory policing model,
matched with the generalised fear provoked by COVID-19
and the securitarian mood of recent years, produced the
spontaneous, disorderly activity of policing from below,
that is, data-gathering and reporting on alleged violators.
The public collaborated with police forces under the guise
of fear, ignoring such things as the violation of privacy and
the penal risks related to arbitrarily stopping a person with-
out being vested with specific powers to do so. One possi-
ble consequence of this spontaneous policing might be
conflict within Italian society between alleged violators
and those who claim to comply with lockdown, and the
consequent creation of a category of stigmatised individu-
als who may swell the ranks of scapegoats upon which
contemporary society relies (Bauman, 1999).
Finally, policing from below goes hand-in-glove with
policing from above, fuelling the populist attitudes of both
individual politicians and political forces who build an
agenda around punishment and social control. This is not
useful for today’s Italy. The country is trying to move on
from the emergency and is facing an unprecedented eco-
nomic crisis as GDP decreased by nearly 15% in the first
quarter of 2020. A reform of policing, focused on decen-
tralisation, demilitarisation and public participation could
be one approach to reconstruction. Drones and online
reporting systems will not help in this.
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La criminalità in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino, 55–66.
Palidda S (2000) Polizia postmoderna. Milan: Feltrinelli.
Pavarini M (ed.) (2007) L’amministrazione locale della paura.
Rome: Carocci.
Putnam R (1985) La tradizione civica nelle regioni italiane.
[(1993). Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern
Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.] Bologna: Il
Mulino.
Putnam R (2004) Capitale sociale e individualismo. [(2002)
Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American commu-
nity. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.] Bologna: Il Mulino.
Regione Emilia-Romagna, Quaderni di Citta’sicure (1995–2000).
[?? English Translation ??] Bologna: Edizioni Regione
Emilia-Romagna.
Reiner R (1997) The Politics of Police. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Selmini R (1999) Sicurezza e prevenzione della criminalità in
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